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The Politics of Local Government
Reform in Northern Ireland
COLIN KNOX
School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland
ABSTRACT A major review of public administration in Northern Ireland has resulted
in proposals for radical reforms in health, education and local government services.
Although originating from the devolved government of 1999, intermittent suspensions
resulted in Direct Rule Ministers taking over responsibility for the review. This article
traces the inﬂuence of a sizeable body of research evidence on the outcomes of the
review, speciﬁcally controversial reforms to local government, and the signiﬁcant
inﬂuence attached to macro political factors in reaching key public policy decisions. It
also highlights the asymmetry in power relations between Stormont and local
government and how devolution has simply compounded regional centralism in
Northern Ireland.
KEY WORDS: Review of Public Administration, Northern Ireland, local
government, evidence based policy making, central–local relations
Introduction
Northern Ireland has witnessed its most signiﬁcant political development for
decades. After years of political stalemate, the Northern Ireland Assembly
was restored on 8 May 2007, following almost ﬁve years of suspension (since
October 2002). The (then) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter
Hain, described the establishment of a power-sharing Executive and
devolved Assembly as ‘the ﬁnal resolution of what has been, for centuries,
the most intractable source of political conﬂict in Europe’ (Hain, 2007: 1).
Witnessing the key protagonists, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and
Sinn Fe´in, going into government together, argued Hain, ‘makes ‘‘historic’’
seem like a cliche´’. Even allowing for the media hyperbole associated with
the occasion, Northern Ireland has entered a new era of political
accommodation with huge expectations for ‘normal’ as opposed to the
zero-sum politics of the last thirty-odd years. Not surprisingly, a backlog of
public policy issues awaited the new Executive, key amongst which were: a
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review of the selective system of secondary-level education, the proposed
introduction of water charges, and public sector reform.
Since the prorogation of Stormont in 1972, acute political, constitutional
and security issues have, for obvious reasons, consumed ministerial energies
and the task of running their departments has, by default, been left to senior
civil servants. Under ‘direct rule’, British Ministers had no electoral base in
Northern Ireland, removing any explicit political accountability. These
circumstances conferred a special status on oﬃcials who wielded virtually
unfettered power and controlled signiﬁcant public resources (Carmichael,
2002b). Whilst ‘normal’ mechanisms of public accountability applied (the
fairly remote prospect of appearing in front of Westminster’s Public
Accounts Committee), Northern Ireland governance was accorded a much
lower priority than macro political issues. Given the context of a unique set
of political arrangements, by comparison with other parts of the UK, this
paper attempts to do three things. First, it will consider the policy making
process in Northern Ireland in the absence of direct ministerial involvement
and the inﬂuences thereon. Secondly, using a case study of local
government, it will consider whether Northern Ireland has embraced the
move towards evidence-based policy making heralded by the Labour
government in the rest of the UK. Thirdly, it will consider the extent to
which devolution in Northern Ireland impacts on regional centralism, which
has characterised central–local government relations since the early 1970s.
Policy Making in Northern Ireland
But for the short interludes when Northern Ireland had devolved
government, policy making has been in the hands of a small civil service
e´lite since 1972. Civil servants, of course, contend that they did not seek such
a monopoly on the decision-making process but, by force of circumstances,
visiting ministers were so preoccupied with more important security matters,
public policy matters were left to them. As one observer of the direct rule
period put it:
The concern now expressed more frequently than in the past is that the
operational impact of the present political circumstances means that
senior civil servants are placed in positions of greater inﬂuence, either
by the eﬀects of direct rule which reduce the involvement of ministers
(who cannot be readily available) or the acceptance by senior oﬃcials
of a higher proﬁle in public. (Simpson, 1997: 4)
Given the powerful role assumed by civil servants, it is no surprise that some
found it diﬃcult to adjust to the accountability demands placed on them by
the return of devolved government in December 1999 (albeit for intermittent
periods thereafter). A leaked memo in 2001 from the (then) Permanent
Secretary of Regional Development highlighted resistance to requests from
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the Assembly’s statutory Environment Committee for access to depart-
mental working papers. The Permanent Secretary referred to practice
elsewhere in the UK and ‘diﬃculties’ created by ‘the lack of the sort of
conventions about the roles of Ministers, oﬃcials, the Assembly,
Committees, etc which have evolved over centuries in Westminster’
(Northern Ireland Assembly, Research and Library Services, 2001: 15).
Members of the Legislative Assembly, in turn, perceived this as civil servants
being unwilling to co-operate with elected representatives. Further criticism
of civil servants came from Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
leader Mark Durkan, who claimed that even during the stop–start spells of
around two and a half years of devolved government since 1999,1 the power-
sharing Executive ‘either tended to be more conservative by instinct or
allowed themselves to be conditioned by the assumptions and attitudes of
civil servants’ (Durkan, 2003: 1). This, he claimed, prevented a more radical
government agenda. Civil servants, on the other hand, argued, in research
commissioned to review their response to devolution, that the long-standing
culture and values of the civil service ‘remained appropriate’. By way of
contrast, politicians and external organisations considered that ‘the need to
develop the culture of the civil service was perhaps the biggest issue’ that
they faced (Oﬃce of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
(OFMDFM), 2002: 23). Speciﬁcally, some devolved government ministers
referred to inﬂexibility of thinking and the need for the civil service to
modernize its approach.
It is also clear that the Northern Ireland Civil Service has managed to
evade or avoid public policy initiatives aimed at improving governance and
policy making in other parts of the UK. Hence, theModernising Government
agenda (Cabinet Oﬃce, 1999a), Professional Policy Making for the 21st
Century (Cabinet Oﬃce, 1999b), Adding it Up (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2000) and
Better Policy Making (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2001) appear to have all but by-
passed Northern Ireland. As a result, Rose’s depiction in 1971 of Northern
Ireland as ‘a place apart’ has been reinforced further as a kind of public
administration backwater of the UK, impervious to attempts aimed at
improving the quality of public service provision. Instead, the Northern
Ireland Civil Service has pursued what it describes as ‘a reform agenda
appropriate to the Northern Ireland context’ outlined in a policy document
entitled Fit for Purpose (OFMDFM, 2004: 8). Therein, its ‘unique’ reform
agenda comprised three core elements: prioritising front-line services;
building capacity amongst its staﬀ; and embracing diversity in its workforce.
In practical terms, implementing the Fit for Purpose agenda is vested in the
Department of Finance and Personnel, which is co-ordinating a major
reform programme under the banner Changing for the Better.2
Northern Ireland departments have been oﬀered guidance on public
policy through a document entitled A Practical Guide to Policy Making in
Northern Ireland, which makes claims to the uniqueness of devolved
government and the need for policy development to be ‘highly inclusive and
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transparent’ (OFMDFM, 2003: foreword). The guide argues that ‘policy
decisions should be based on sound evidence’ and lists internal departmental
sources, government-funded independent bodies and non-governmental
organisations as the ‘likely sources of information and expertise on evidence
to support policy making’ (ibid.: 23). The policy making guide fails to
acknowledge, however, what Williams (2002: 89) refers to as the wider
political factors to which policy makers typically give weight, one of which is
‘controversiality – the extent of likely support or opposition among those
most aﬀected’. Since the guide was written by civil servants primarily for a
civil servant audience, straying into political territory may have been seen as
outside their brief.
Yet, more recent research from the Government’s Social Research Unit,
conducted on policy making in Whitehall departments, the Scottish
Executive and the Welsh Assembly, contrasts markedly with the Northern
Ireland guidance by acknowledging ‘The reality of policy making/delivery
was described (by civil servants) as messy and unpredictable. Importantly,
there was a clear understanding that evidence is just one factor to be taken
into consideration alongside other factors such as the political imperative
and response to media and world events’ (Campbell et al., 2007: 6).
The Social Research Unit makes reference to non-research factors that
also inﬂuence policy and includes the role played by ministers in reaching
policy decisions. Some ministers, they reported, routinely ask for evidence
from their oﬃcials, others were less concerned with an evidence base or, as
one of the interviewees in their research put it, ‘there is a political context to
almost everything we do . . . There are often political commitments that lead
you in directions that the evidence doesn’t necessarily strongly support’
(Campbell et al., 2007: 14).
So strong is the political inﬂuence that Hope (2006) sees a basic
‘incompatibility between the ideology of evidence-based policy and the
natural inclination of the political process to want to secure the best
outcomes’ for itself (quoted in Grayson, 2006: 397). Burton (2006: 191) has
argued that the ‘utilisation of research-based knowledge is driven as much
by political expediency and broader social and political factors as it is by
standards of objective truth and epistemological certainty’. He suggests
policy researchers need to become more politically savvy as well as
technically skilled if they are to have inﬂuence. Similarly, Parsons (2002: 58)
recognises ‘that ‘‘facts’’ are embedded in the world of values and politics and
competing frames’ whereas ‘evidence based policy making wishes to
extricate them from the political/value quagmire’. He endorses Scho¨n’s
idea that government should facilitate reﬂective organisations to self-
transform, in contrast to the modernising agenda which is predicated on
strategic steering where ‘prediction and control is so diﬃcult and ‘‘evidence’’
is so problematic’ (ibid.: 51). Beyond the inﬂuence of politics, Davies (2004),
drawing on the work of Nutley et al. (2003), highlights the experience,
expertise and judgement of decision makers as important inﬂuences on
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policy making, particularly in situations where evidence is equivocal,
imperfect or non-existent. Given the powerful role exerted by civil servants
in Northern Ireland and the absence of a UK modernising agenda, was there
an evidence-based approach to public policy making?
The Review of Public Administration
To try and understand the policy making process in Northern Ireland, we
examine in some detail how the (then) British Secretary of State, Peter Hain,
and his ministers reached key decisions on a major public administration
reform programme. In one of its earlier incarnations, the Northern Ireland
Assembly decided that a pressing priority was to reform and modernise its
public services. The Northern Ireland reform agenda has three main foci:
investing in the infrastructure needed to deliver public services; improving
public services; and a Review of Public Administration, which looked at
who provided services, the way they were provided and how eﬀectively they
met the needs of the citizen (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002). At the
outset, the (then) First Minister argued that the Review of Public
Administration was one of the major tasks facing the Northern Ireland
Executive and presented ‘an opportunity of a generation to put in place a
modern, accountable, eﬀective system of public administration that can
deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens’ (Trimble, 2002:
371). Years of neglect and short-term political ‘solutions’ had left the
administrative landscape of public services in Northern Ireland complex and
bureaucratically cumbersome. Northern Ireland was both over-governed
and over-administered, in part as a result of political intransigence and poor
governance (Carmichael, 2002a). With three MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 MLAs and
582 councillors, all for a population of 1.7 million people, it is hardly
surprising that outside observers were bewildered by the extent of political
representation yet little or no political progress (until recently). Equally, 11
government departments, 18 executive agencies, ﬁve health and social
services boards, four education and library boards, 18 health trusts, 26 local
authorities and over 100 non-departmental public bodies could only prompt
the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee in Westminster to complain
that ‘we found again and again that the quality of governance in Northern
Ireland has been below par compared to the rest of the United Kingdom’
(Leigh, 2006: 253).
The Review of Public Administration was launched in June 2002 to
consider ‘existing arrangements for accountability, administration and
delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options
for reform consistent with the arrangements and principles of the Belfast
Agreement’ (Review of Public Administration, 2002). Although initiated
under devolved government arrangements, its stewardship by local ministers
lasted just over four months before suspension of the Assembly in October
2002. Hence, almost the entire work of the Review was conducted through
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a multi-disciplinary team of oﬃcials in the Oﬃce of the Minister and Deputy
First Minister, working with the advice of a group of independent experts
and reporting to a direct rule British minister (Birrell, 2007). Its original
time-scale to produce conclusive recommendations by the end of 2003
proved overly optimistic and ‘ﬁnal’ decisions on the outcomes were not
announced by the Secretary of State until March 2006 (OFMDFM, 2006).
Along the way, the review team produced a comprehensive body of
empirical/research work that included: attitudinal surveys; qualitative data
capturing the views of users, public sector staﬀ and key stakeholders;
comparative information gathered through study visits; a mapping exercise
to unravel the complexities of the public sector; and brieﬁng papers on issues
relevant to the Review. The outcomes of the Review of Administration
(ibid., 2006: 5) refer directly to the body of research outlined above ‘that
helped to inform these decisions’. In addition, the review team carried out
two major Northern Ireland-wide public consultation exercises. The ﬁrst
consultation paper was published in October 2003 and attracted 174 formal
responses, and the second follow-up consultation in March 2005 resulted in
1032 responses. In short, the body of research evidence that underpinned the
Review was thorough and the level of stakeholder and vested interest high,
perhaps not too surprising, given that the Northern Ireland economy is
dominated by the public sector (with some 32 per cent of the NI workforce
employed in the public sector, compared to the UK average of 22 per cent).
The resulting public administration reforms package announced by the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was wide ranging. A new Education
and Skills Authority to replace a number of education bodies with direct
support functions (including the ﬁve education and library boards); a single
Health and Social Services Authority to subsume the four health and social
services boards; 18 health trusts reduced to ﬁve; some 81 quangos to be cut
to 53; and proposals for the 26 local authorities to be reduced to seven
‘super-councils’. In sum, the reforms when fully implemented claim to cut
the number of public bodies in half from 154 to 75, with a roll-out timetable
to mid-2009.
Evidence-Based Policy Making?
So were the ﬁnal decisions of the Review of Public Administration
inﬂuenced by the substantial body of evidence and research which ran in
parallel with the decision-making process, as the ﬁnal government report
claims? We consider the issue of local government reforms as an example to
test this claim. Since 1973, local government in Northern Ireland has
provided a limited range of public functions conﬁned largely to recreation,
leisure, street cleaning, refuse collection and certain regulatory services (e.g.
building regulations and environmental health) (Birrell & Murie, 1980). Its
current scale is illustrated by the fact that in 2005/06, the local government
sector as a whole had a net expenditure of around £360 million, out of a
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budget for devolved functions of £7.5 billion, less than 5 per cent
(Department of Finance and Personnel, 2006). Councils had been stripped
of powers for their part in what Whyte (1983: 30) described as a ‘consistent
and irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against Catholics’ in
electoral practices, public employment, policing, public housing and
regional policy, respectively. One of the core principles of the Review of
Public Administration, following years of delivering minor functions, was to
deliver ‘strong local government’ with ‘councils at the heart of the local
community providing civic leadership, ensuring the provision of local
services, locally delivered, and working with local interests to develop their
areas’ (OFMDFM, 2006: 5). Decisions on local government reforms in the
Review of Public Administration included the following:
. local councils will be reduced from 26 to seven. The boundaries of the
new councils were decided through an Independent Boundary Commis-
sioner and are largely based on groupings of existing councils;
. the new councils will have an increased range of powers;
. councils will have legal powers to lead a community planning process,
and there will be a statutory duty on other agencies to work with the
councils. In addition, councils will also have the power of ‘well-being’;
. the number of councillors will be reduced from 582 councillors to 420
(seven councils by 60 councillors);
. a system of statutory checks and balances will be developed to ensure
there is fair and transparent decision making within the new councils;
. a new system of local government ﬁnance will be developed.
The proposed time-scale for implementation of the above reforms is that
elections were to be held to new shadow councils in 2008, which would
become fully operational in spring 2009 (a timetable now abandoned).
Did the evidence support these reforms? The most controversial decision
reached by the Review was to reduce the number of councils from 26 to
seven. We consider three key elements of data gathering most relevant to the
determination of the ﬁnal number of councils – survey evidence, public
consultation and stakeholder views. Two additional and detailed research
exercises were commissioned by the Review Team to: (a) produce various
council groupings that would provide for an even tax base across Northern
Ireland and (b) geographical information systems (GIS)-generated admin-
istrative zones based on compactness, travel to work and population, not
exceeding 300,000 (McCluskey et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2005). The former
concluded that ‘splitting the province into a few large areas is unlikely to
produce an even tax base under either the existing or proposed rating
systems’ (McCluskey et al., 2004: 26). The latter claimed that ‘no single set
of zones is clearly ‘‘optimal’’ and the most sensible approach is to detail
several sets of zones which can be considered in light of other (additional)
criteria’ (Lloyd, 2005: 12).
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During public consultation on the changes, three options were oﬀered:
seven, 11 or 15 councils. The (then) minister responsible, Lord Rooker
(2005a), in announcing the government’s ‘ﬁnal’ decisions on local
government reform stated: ‘This morning the Secretary of State (Peter
Hain) announced that all of the evidence – and I stress evidence – not
opinion or speculation, pointed to seven councils as the optimum model for
local government in Northern Ireland. This was a view shared by almost
two-thirds of respondents to the consultation who expressed a preference’.
This statement provided the rationale for selecting the seven-council
model. We consider the various sources of evidence in some detail.
Survey Evidence
To test public opinion on proposals to reform councils, the government’s
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) conducted a
probability survey between June and August 2005 of 1148 people (from a
representative sample of almost 2000 people: 59 per cent response rate).
One of the questions posed in the survey was: ‘In terms of the Review’s
proposal to reduce the number of councils to either 7, 11 or 15, do you have
a preference?’. The survey ﬁndings are set out in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Public Consultation
In addition to the above Northern Ireland survey, evidence was provided as
a result of the responses to the ‘RPA: Further Consultation Document’
(March 2005) which attracted 1032 replies.3 However, the majority of these
responses came from lobby campaign groups in the education sector. The
non-campaign-related responses amounted to 443 returns within the
consultation. Some 113 consultees expressed a preference for a number or
range of councils. Of these, 70 of the consultees expressed a preference for
seven councils (62 per cent); 80 of the consultees expressed a preference for
11 councils or less (71 per cent); and 20 of the consultees expressed a
preference for 15 councils (18 per cent).
Comparing the public consultation and survey data, therefore, we can
summarise the responses in Table 2. The data show that Lord Rooker based
Table 1. Preferences for local councils
Answer Percentage Number
Seven councils 13 150
Eleven councils 11 126
Fifteen councils 27 310
No preference 43 493
Others 6 69
Total 100 1148
442 C. Knox
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his decision to reduce the number of councils to seven on the views of 70
self-selected consultees responding to the Review’s further consultation
document. He ‘spun’ the announcement by referring to evidence supporting
the seven-council model from ‘almost two-thirds of respondents to the
consultation who expressed a preference’ (in essence 70 consultees from
113). Lord Rooker failed to mention the survey data based on a random
sample of people throughout Northern Ireland (data which can be
extrapolated to the overall population within conﬁdence intervals) in which
respondents who made their preference known overwhelmingly supported
the 15-council option. Lord Rooker’s successor (Minister of State David
Hanson), when challenged to explain this anomaly, defended his decision by
claiming that respondents to the consultation paper were ‘able to take a
much more considered view of the issues’ and, by implication, the views of a
randomly selected sample of the population of Northern Ireland should be
ignored – as they were (Hanson, 2007: 10). Whilst attaching weight to the
Figure 1. How many councils?
Table 2. Public consultation and public survey evidence
Public consultation Public surveya
Preference Percentage Number Percentage Number
Seven councils 62 70 26 150
Eleven councils or less 20 23 21 126
Fifteen councils 18 20 53 310
Total 100 113 100 586
aThese ﬁgures discount the ‘no preference’ and ‘others’ from the survey data to make it
comparable with the public consultation data.
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opinions of some consultees, the minister, on the other hand, chose to reject
the views of key stakeholders in the local government debate, in particular
the political parties. We now consider the views of the key stakeholders.
Stakeholder Views
When the (then) Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Ian Pearson,
launched the second public consultation document on public administration
reforms, he said ‘I am grateful for the positive engagement and responses to
the previous consultation document from key stakeholders, the political
parties and individuals, which have helped inform the debate. I have listened
carefully to the range of views expressed, in particular in relation to the
future of local government’ (Pearson, 2005: 1).
There was widespread agreement amongst the local government sector4
on the need for a reduction in the number of councils, with most favouring a
15-council option. On the same token, all but one of the political parties
(Sinn Fe´in) opposed the move to seven councils. The concerns of the four
main parties, who favoured 15 councils, centred on changes to an elected
forum which had remained consistently stable since 1973, and the loss of
local identity. New councils would be too remote. There would be no sense
of a local cohesive area, making civic leadership impossible, in areas which
did not naturally perceive themselves as a community. The services returned
to local authorities did not warrant the need for seven councils, they argued,
as many functions could be provided on a shared basis (Weir, 2006a: 20).
The government refused to back down on its decision to move to seven
super-councils, provoking the following response from the President of the
Northern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA), the cross-party
umbrella body representing the sector:
I am totally shocked and dismayed that the Secretary of State, Peter
Hain, has embarked on a course of action which completely
undermines the opinions of the majority of elected representatives
throughout the sector. NILGA is furious at the Government’s
decision. It is obvious that direct rule Ministers have completely
ignored the legitimate voice of local politicians and proceeded with
their own agenda to impose a seven council model. (NILGA Press
Release 22 November, 2005a)
Most importantly, however, there is real potential for ‘balkanisation’ of
Northern Ireland with the proposed structural reforms to councils. The
government had produced a key policy document entitled A Shared Future
(OFMDFM, 2005: 11), which aimed at moving the polarised Province
towards a more integrated ethno-religious society, described as ‘sharing over
separation’. Lord Rooker (2005b), in outlining the ﬁnal decisions of the
Review of Public Administration, said: ‘One of the key functions of councils
444 C. Knox
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will be to foster good community relations. The development of strong local
government in Northern Ireland is a ‘‘lightening rod’’ for a shared future. In
future councils will ensure that good relations are earthed in the needs of
local communities’.
In fact, the proposed amalgamation of existing councils into the seven
‘super councils’ will accentuate community divisions, as Table 3 (see
Figure 2) illustrates. In eﬀect, councils in the west of the Province will be
nationalist/republican controlled and those in the east, Unionist dominated,
with the exceptions of ﬁnely balanced Belfast City Council and the southern
amalgam of local authorities. The proposals prompted (then) DUP Leader,
Ian Paisley (recently retired First Minister in the new Northern Ireland
Assembly) to comment ‘this is a clear attempt to split the Province –
nationalists will be able to develop their United Ireland policy in the
councils that they dominate’ (Paisley, 2005). Osborne (2007: 93), in his work
on the equality agenda in Northern Ireland, highlights the fact that such
sectarian calculations can simply promote zero-sum politics and increase
tensions, but draws back from suggesting the abandonment of monitoring
data along ethno-religious lines.
There was also dissatisfaction amongst stakeholders about the marginal
increase in powers for local government proposed under the changes.
Political parties argued that a wide range of powers should transfer from
central to local government. The NILGA (2005b: 3), in its response to the
Review of Public Administration, ‘strenuously opposed the reduction in the
number of councils without the return of a signiﬁcant level of services’.
What is on oﬀer under the Review of Public Administration is a signiﬁcant
reduction in the number of councils with a marginal increase in powers,
perhaps a reﬂection of the sector’s own timidity when given the opportunity
to ‘bid’ for a much wider role in public service provision. Taking into
account the new functions devolved to local government, little more than
ten per cent of the public purse will be controlled by councils. Hardly ‘strong
local government’, as the government claims.
All of this seemed somewhat at odds with ministerial contentions to be
working in partnership with key stakeholders. The Review of Public
Table 3. A balkanised Northern Ireland
Proposed council areas Population
Catholics
(per cent)
Protestants &
others
(per cent)
Cookstown, Dungannon, Fermanagh, Omagh 185,795 62 38
Derry, Limavady, Magherafelt, Strabane 215,516 69 31
Armagh, Banbridge, Craigavon, Newry & Mourne 263,384 55 45
Belfast 277,391 47 53
Ballymena, Ballymoney, Coleraine, Larne, Moyle 188,584 28 72
Antrim, Carrickfergus, Lisburn, Newtownabbey 274,714 27 73
Ards, Castlereagh, Down, North Down 279,883 25 75
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Administration Further Consultation document (2005b: 3.15, 27) argued:
‘The central assumption of the Review of Public Administration is that the
new model of public administration will operate within the context of a
return to devolution. On that basis, Minister Ian Pearson has worked closely
with the main local political parties to ensure that they are content with the
model that was being developed’.
Vested Interests
One of the core principles of the Review of Public Administration was
subsidiarity, referred to in the Better Government for Northern Ireland
(OFMDFM, 2006: 5) paper as ‘delivering services and exercising power as
close to the people as possible’. That means, according to the government,
‘local councils having responsibility for the delivery of a wide range of
services that aﬀect the lives of people living in their areas’ (ibid.: 5). To
operationalise this principle, the Review Team modelled their reforms on a
two-tier system of public administration (Figure 3).
The ﬁrst tier is a regional tier encompassing the Assembly, government
departments and regional authorities, the focus of which is policy
development, setting standards and delivering regional services. The second
tier, a sub-regional tier, encompasses organisations that operate within
Figure 2. The seven proposed super-councils
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common boundaries to include councils, health bodies, sub-regional bodies
and delivery units of regional bodies. The model assumed delivery at the
sub-regional tier unless economies of scale (or other factors) dictated
delivery on a regional basis.
Feedback from the second consultation paper suggested there was
widespread support for the two-tier model, particularly the separation in the
role of central government departments, local service delivery, and an
enhanced role for the voluntary and community sector. There was also
backing for the transfer of powers to local government contained in the
responses to the consultation document. ‘People, generally, wanted to see a
more vibrant local government that would have a greater range of
responsibilities and inﬂuence’ (Review of Public Administration, 2005b).
These qualitative responses produced as evidence from the public
consultation can be conﬁrmed by more representative quantitative data.
Figure 3. Two-tier model of public administration
The Politics of Local Government Reform in Northern Ireland 447
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sw
et
s 
Co
nt
en
t 
Di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
] 
At
: 
10
:1
3 
19
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
09
The 2005/06 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (a probability sample
of 1200 adults aged 18 years or over) asked respondents to rank: ‘Which of
the following have the most impact on people’s everyday lives: local
councils, the civil service or the Northern Ireland Assembly?’. The results
from the survey are set out in Table 4.
Not surprisingly, the Northern Ireland Assembly is seen as having least
impact on the lives of people. The data from the survey were collected
between October 2005 to January 2006, during which the Assembly had
been suspended (for the fourth time) since October 2002. If we test the
results (two related dichotomous variables) there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
people’s attitudes to these institutions (Cochran’s Q (2)¼ 175.6, p5 0.05).
What these data conﬁrm is that the role played by local councils in Northern
Ireland is far beyond their limited functional responsibilities – councillors
are the ﬁrst point of contact for people having problems with public services.
Moreover, the data also highlight the democratic deﬁcit in the absence of a
functioning Assembly (at that time) and the power base of civil servants
under direct rule government – the civil service was perceived as highly
inﬂuential by the public.
Consistent with the regional/local subsidiary model and the empirical
evidence on the impact of local government, NILGA strenuously opposed
any reduction in the number of councils without the return of core public
services. NILGA argued that local government should be of suﬃcient size
and signiﬁcance to be a partner with central government and provide an
eﬀective balance of power (NILGA, 2005b). As the new devolved Assembly
commenced business (May 2007), the central–local partnership concept
based on the principle of subsidiary is a myth. Key public services are still
vested in the hands of powerful civil servants with a centralised public
administration system across 11 government departments, untouched by the
Review of Public Administration. This suggests that there is no power-
dependent relationship between central and local government in Northern
Ireland (Rhodes, 1986). The contrast with devolved government in Scotland
and Wales is striking here (Bennett et al., 2002; Laﬃn et al., 2002; McAteer
& Bennett, 2005; McConnell, 2006). The Welsh Assembly sees local
government as crucial in delivering eﬀective public services. As Laﬃn (2004:
216, 220) puts it ‘for them [the Welsh Assembly] local government forms a
vital implementation structure which absorbs about a third of the Assembly
budget’ and the Welsh Assembly is ‘considerably more dependent on local
Table 4. Most impact on people’s lives
Impact on people’s
lives (per cent)
No impact on people’s
lives (per cent)
Local councils 431 (36) 769 (64)
Civil service 367 (31) 833 (69)
Northern Ireland Assembly 155 (13) 1045 (87)
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government than central government is on English local government; and a
similar argument can be advanced in Scotland’. Compare this to councils in
Northern Ireland, which deliver minor functions in waste collection,
environmental health and leisure services accounting (at present) for less
than ﬁve per cent of public expenditure. In this sense Northern Ireland is
more like England, which is characterised by asymmetric central–local
relations in favour of the centre. Devolved regional government in Northern
Ireland has not resulted in regional centralism (where powers became more
centralised at Stormont), rather it has simply reinforced the status quo of
asymmetric relations, with a strong centre and locally elected ministers
reluctant to transfer functions to councils. Here again, the contrast with
other parts of the UK is plain. Laﬃn (2007) argues that devolution does not
inevitably lead to regional centralism, particularly where a power balance or
symmetry exists between regional and local governments, as in the case of
Wales and Scotland. Yet, in Northern Ireland, regional centralism pre-dates
devolution and is rooted in the abuse of power by local government which,
in part, sparked the civil rights marches and ‘troubles’ in the late 1960s.
With the emergence of devolution in 1999 and the lust for political power,
largely denied for over 25 years, Members of the Northern Ireland
Legislative Assembly did not feel inclined towards strengthening the role
of local government.
The degree of central government insulation from the wider UK reform
process is also illustrated by the exclusion of the Northern Ireland civil
service from capability reviews conducted on Westminster departments
(independent assessments of how departments are performing). The former
Chair of the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee
(Billy Bell) commented:
The Northern Ireland departments have already evaded inspection
under the Review of Public Administration. To my mind, that was
quite wrong – I never understood how a comprehensive review of
public administration could be carried out in Northern Ireland which
excluded civil service departments and conﬁned itself only to councils
and health and education boards. Many people in the councils and
boards feel very aggrieved that they should be subject to a major
review, facing a very uncertain job future, while the civil servants in the
departments get oﬀ scot-free. (Bell, 2005: 1)
There is, however, substantial evidence of the need for reforms to both the
structure and eﬀectiveness of central government departments in Northern
Ireland. Parry’s (2003) work on the issues facing the civil service in Scotland
under devolution is equally signiﬁcant in Northern Ireland. He described
four challenges facing Scottish civil servants: how they present themselves
and relate to others; how they conﬁgure and operate the administrative
machine; how they see themselves relating to the traditions of the Civil
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Service; and how they equip themselves to advise ministers on policy
development. Former Minister Lord Rooker, for example, described the
structure of 11 NI departments as ‘absolutely bamy’. During his time as a
direct rule minister in Northern Ireland with line responsibility for four
departments he said, ‘let’s face it, the structure of 11 departments is illogical.
Every week I ﬁnd I am responsible for something new. The structure was
created after the Good Friday Agreement to ensure there were enough
ministerial portfolios to share between parties’ (Rooker, 2005c: 1). Yet,
performance by civil service departments has attracted severe criticism from
Westminster’s Public Accounts Committee. One member noted ‘I am
worried that Northern Ireland’s citizens and taxpayers may not be receiving
the service we expect to see in the rest of the United Kingdom. The overall
message must be, in all the areas that we have looked at, there is enormous
scope to improve’ (Bacon, 2006: 11).
Conclusions
So why would (direct rule) ministers choose to ignore empirical evidence in
reaching decisions about public administration reform in Northern Ireland?
Were there wider political issues at stake? The position of Sinn Fe´in on local
government reform is instructive. All political parties resolutely opposed the
reduction in the numbers of councils from 26 to seven, except Sinn Fe´in. The
obvious question is why was Sinn Fe´in supportive of direct rule ministers on
this issue? This is all the more intriguing when one of its senior members
(Francie Molloy), who held the post of vice-president of the Northern
Ireland Local Government Association, was suspended by Sinn Fe´in in
November 2005 for contravening party policy and adopting NILGA’s
position in favour of 15 councils.
Two issues arise from the seemingly apolitical public services reform
agenda. First, the political demography of the seven-council model may well
allow Sinn Fe´in to gain control of sizeable areas west of the Province, in
keeping with accusations from the DUP that this is an insidious threat to
move the Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan and Monaghan borders and expand the
Republic of Ireland. Secondly, the controversial nature of the public
administration reform agenda was to goad the political parties into
responding positively to a power-sharing executive and the restoration of
devolution. This was captured by one minister’s informal remark ‘if you
don’t like it, you know what to do’, a clear reference to local representatives
participating in devolved government. In a debate in the transitional
Assembly, one DUP representative voiced concerns about government
tactics:
The Government has constantly blocked debate on the Review of
Public Administration issue because the decision to support a seven-
council model is one of the least justiﬁable of their many bad recent
450 C. Knox
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Sw
et
s 
Co
nt
en
t 
Di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
] 
At
: 
10
:1
3 
19
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
09
decisions. It has the least merit, is the most politically driven and has
been produced for the wrong reasons. It is particularly appalling that
the Government has used the issues of reform of public administration
and the number of councils as devices in its wider schemes for political
progress in Northern Ireland. (Weir, 2006b)
As a result of this debate, the transitional Assembly expressed serious
disquiet about the potential of a seven-council model to centralise services,
remove jobs and resources from many areas, and to underpin sectarianism
and community division; and called on the Secretary of State ‘to shelve
present plans for super councils and allow the decision on future council
arrangements to be taken by a restored Northern Ireland Assembly’
(Hansard, 5 December 2006).
The reforms arising from the Review of Public Administration were
described as ‘a vision of change that represents the greatest single challenge
to the public sector in Northern Ireland for over 30 years’ (Hain, 2005: 14).
From our analysis it is clear that key empirical evidence in reaching
decisions on the potential reform package was ignored. Should we be
surprised by this? Young et al. (2002) contrast the ideal type policy process
and the realities of policy making in the following way. In the former,
‘information is supplied which is objective, and possibly conclusive,
reducing uncertainties about the relationship between policies and out-
comes’. In the latter, ‘decisions are less about projected consequences and
more about process and legitimation. Politics is about shaping interpreta-
tions and expressing preferences’ (ibid.: 218). In fact, the Northern Ireland
case study is a good example of Young et al.’s ‘political/tactical’ model in
which policy is an outcome of the wider political process (in this case,
forcing local politicians to share power). Their warning (ibid.: 217) that ‘in
extreme cases the research/researcher can become vulnerable to political
attack’ transpired. Minister Hanson, somewhat ironically, attacked the
evidence presented by this author as being ‘selective in the information
chosen’ and ‘not providing alternative research in support of another
council model’ (Hanson, 2007:10).
The Review of Public Administration accumulated a signiﬁcant body of
evidence to support the ﬁnal decisions arrived at by the Secretary of State.
Expecting the outcomes to be causally linked to the evidence is to ignore the
messy realities of the decision-making process in Northern Ireland and
elsewhere. Civil servants, with their monopoly on power, and largely
unaﬀected by the wider UK modernising agenda which promoted the
primacy of evidence-based policy making, drove the reform agenda. A
hand-picked team of oﬃcials conducted the Review of Public Administra-
tion and, by design, the process excluded government departments. In
‘normal’ direct rule circumstances the will of senior civil servants would
have prevailed. But a bigger political prize was at stake. Direct rule ministers
sought to provoke locally elected representatives and their political parties
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into agreeing to devolution by deliberately opposing their views on the
reforms of local government. Local government reform in Northern Ireland
is perhaps an unintended example of the kind of process referred to by
Parsons (2002: 56) who, drawing on the work of Lasswell, argued that the
aim of policy sciences is to contribute to the democratisation of the policy-
making process, in contrast to an evidence-based approach which seeks ‘to
de-politicise and managerialise knowledge production and its utilisation’.
With the return to a devolved administration in Northern Ireland, local
government reform is back on the policy agenda and the new Assembly
reviewed ‘ﬁnal’ decisions by their direct rule predecessors to set up seven
‘super-councils’. Local Department of Environment Minister, Arlene
Foster, launched ‘a review of the review’ in August 2007 and subsequently
overturned both the number and functions of local government agreed in
the Review of Public Administration. The instrumental rationality synon-
ymous with evidence-based policy was eschewed by direct rule ministers in
favour of political decision making and locally elected ministers followed
suit. Despite hostility from the local government community, Minister
Foster announced to the Northern Ireland Assembly (31 March 2008) that:
. the number of councils in Northern Ireland will now be rationalised
from 26 to 11;
. additional functions of the new councils will include local development
plans; local public realm aspects of roads; urban regeneration and
community development; housing-related functions; local economic
development; and local tourism, arts, sports and leisure;
. an independent Local Government Boundaries Commissioner was
appointed (for the second time) to redraw 11 new council boundaries;
. a local government modernisation process will be supported by the
Department of the Environment;
. the timeline for reorganised local government will now be elections to
the new councils in 2011.
The new functions will require a 25 per cent increase in council budgets and
12 per cent increase in council staﬃng. This suggests an annual (new)
council expenditure of around £575 million out of a total devolved budget of
around £8 billion – just over seven per cent of the public purse. Councils
have been oﬀered public realm roads responsibilities, such as weed spraying
and emptying gullies, hardly the stuﬀ of ‘strong local government’ promised
at the outset of the Review of Public Administration. Local government will
remain for the foreseeable future a relatively minor player in the governance
arrangements of Northern Ireland. The asymmetry of power relationships
between Stormont and councils has not shifted as a result of devolution.
Instead, there has been a marginal increase in the functions of local
government and a Policy Development Panel, comprising councillors and
local government oﬃcers, established to develop central–local relations
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under the new eleven-council arrangements. The Policy Development Panel
will report to a Strategic Leadership Board set up to oversee the transition
process until 2011 and chaired by the Minister of the Environment. Drawing
on the Welsh model, current proposals are to establish a statutory
Partnership Panel comprising joint membership from the Northern Ireland
Executive and local government elected representatives. In practice, given
the lack of power dependence between the central and local government, it is
diﬃcult to see this as anything other than a mechanism for communication,
consultation and advice.
In summary, the decisions on the reform of local government in Northern
Ireland were always going to be politically determined. This paper sought to
test the robustness of the minister’s claim that they were otherwise.
Devolution and the Review of Public Administration have not provided the
opportunities to strengthen the role of local government in Northern
Ireland. Instead, the asymmetry of power relationships between central and
local government has been reinforced, aided and abetted by a powerful civil
service unwilling to see their departments dismantled and functions
devolved to councils. The political outworkings of the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement, in which political parties are keen to demonstrate their
ministerial credentials, has compounded these centripetal tendencies.
Regional centralism and limited local government best characterise
Northern Ireland’s governance arrangements now and in the future.
Notes
1 Until the current power-sharing Assembly took oﬃce on 8 May 2007, there had been four
periods of devolution in Northern Ireland since the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement: 2
December 1999–11 February 2000; 30 May 2000–10 August 2001; 12 August 2001–21
September 2001; and 23 September 2001–14 October 2002.
2 The key reforms include: the review of public administration; investment strategy for
Northern Ireland; water, rating, health and education reforms; welfare modernisation; and
civil service reform.
3 The Further Consultation document secured 1032 responses but was used in a concerted
campaign by the education sector to lobby around two speciﬁc reform issues – the future of:
the Catholic Council for Maintained Schools (CCMS), and the youth services. Extracting the
campaign-related responses (n¼ 589) resulted in 443 ‘usable’ replies to the consultation.
4 See responses from individual local authorities (www.rpani.gov.uk).
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